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Reponses to John M. DePoe
A Phenomenal Conservative 
Response to Classical Evidentialism
Logan Paul Gage and Blake McAllister
There is a lot of agreement between Classical Evidentialism and the 
Phenomenal Conservative approach we have defended.1 Both are 
internalist. Both are evidentialist. Both are foundationalist. Both claim 
that properly basic beliefs are justified by evidence from a certain kind of 
mental state. (Indeed, if we weren’t Phenomenal Conservatives, we might 
well be Classical Evidentialists in the vein of DePoe.) Our disagreement 
lies mostly at the foundations. DePoe claims that properly basic beliefs 
must be incorrigible—the sort about which you can’t be mistaken—while 
Phenomenal Conservatives allow anything that seems true to be properly 
basic in the absence of defeaters. According to DePoe, basing everything on 
incorrigible beliefs helps maintain two desiderata:
 (1) An objective connection between justification and truth, and
 (2) The subjective assurance that justified beliefs are true.
In the following, we’ll explain some problems for DePoe’s view and why
we think Phenomenal Conservatism is superior.
§1 An Objective Connection
to Truth
DePoe thinks that justified beliefs are objectively likely to be true, and that 
Classical Evidentialism, because of its appeal to incorrigible beliefs, accounts 
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for this feature of justification in a way that other internalist theories (like 
ours) do not. But what does it mean for a belief to be objectively probable? 
The most natural interpretation is that the belief is true in most nearby 
possible worlds. That is, in most situations similar to the subject’s, that belief 
is in fact true. In this sense, not even Classical Evidentialism ensures that 
justified beliefs are objectively probable.
Consider a subject, let’s call him “Unlucky,” who is being deceived by 
Descartes’s evil demon. From the inside, things appear to Unlucky exactly 
as they do to us. Starting from incorrigible beliefs, Unlucky makes all 
the same inferences about the world that we do: he believes that he has 
a body, that there is an external world in which his body is located, that 
the external world includes the planet Earth which existed long before 
he did, and so on. Unfortunately, Unlucky’s beliefs are all false. He is 
a disembodied spirit, there is no external world, and everything came 
into existence right as Unlucky did. Unlucky’s beliefs are all objectively 
improbable as well, since they remain false in all the possible worlds 
similar to his. Nevertheless, Unlucky’s beliefs are justified. (Classical 
Evidentialists must affirm this on pain of skepticism, since our own 
beliefs are justified only if Unlucky’s are. We all base our beliefs on the 
same evidence, after all.)
What this example shows is that, as soon as we stray beyond incorrigible 
beliefs, it doesn’t matter how carefully we follow the evidence, we cannot 
thereby guarantee that our beliefs are objectively probable in the above 
sense. It is a mistake to demand such guarantees from justification. Thus, 
neither Classical Evidentialism nor the Phenomenal Conservative approach 
satisfies (1), so understood. We are just upfront about this fact.
Perhaps there is a different sense in which justified beliefs need to be 
objectively probable. Perhaps DePoe only means that the evidence one 
possesses needs to rationally support the content of your belief, making it 
epistemically probable, and that rational support of this sort is an objective 
matter (objective epistemic probability). Classical Evidentialism can account 
for the objective likelihood of justified beliefs in this sense, but arguably so 
can Phenomenal Conservatism. When something seems true, and there 
are no other relevant considerations, that experience makes its content 
objectively epistemically probable for the subject.2 That is, the seeming bears 
an objective support relation to its content.
In summary, the only kind of objective connection that Classical 
Evidentialism provides is one that Phenomenal Conservatism can plausibly 
provide as well. Thus, there is no advantage for Classical Evidentialism here.
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§2 The Subjective Assurance
of Truth
We agree that part of justification is having some indication from the 
first-person perspective that the belief is true. We also agree that certain 
incorrigible beliefs have this in a supreme way. Consider the law of 
noncontradictions: it cannot be the case that p and ~p are both true at the 
same time and in the same way. What kind of subjective assurance do you 
have in this principle? First and foremost, that, when you consider it, it feels 
utterly obvious. We would describe this by saying it feels true in an especially 
strong way. There is a certain phenomenal character at play here—the feel 
of truth—which makes the content of a mental state evident. Incorrigible 
judgments are based on experiences that have this “truth-y” phenomenal 
character in a (virtually) maximal way, which gives us maximal subjective 
assurance in their truth.
You’ll notice, however, that many other judgments are based on experiences 
with this same truth-y phenomenal character. For instance, perceptual 
beliefs are based on perceptual appearances in which propositions about 
our proximate physical environments are made evident. These perceptual 
appearances may not feel as true as the appearances underlying incorrigible 
judgments, but the difference is one of degree, not kind. Indeed, when we 
say that something “seems true,” all we mean is that the subject has a mental 
state with this truth-y phenomenal character. Thus, any belief whose content 
seems true has the same sort of subjective assurance enjoyed by incorrigible 
beliefs, albeit to a lesser degree.
Now, Classical Evidentialists say that only beliefs with maximal subjective 
assurance—that is, incorrigible beliefs—can be properly basic. Why place 
the bar so high? One traditional motivation is this:  if the foundations 
are guaranteed to be true, then surely anything properly based on those 
foundations is also guaranteed to be true, or at least true in most nearby 
possible worlds. In other words, demanding maximal subjective assurance 
at the foundations is supposed to secure the objective connection to truth. 
We saw in the last section, however, that such an idea is mistaken. Not even 
Classical Evidentialism can guarantee that justified beliefs are objectively 
probable in this sense.3
The other traditional motivation is that incorrigible beliefs enjoy a 
special kind of reflective assurance. That is, when you ask yourself whether 
an incorrigible belief is true, you are immediately able to see that it is, 
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dispelling any doubts. The hope of Classical Evidentialists is that limiting the 
foundations to incorrigible beliefs will transfer this same kind of reflective 
assurance to anything based on those foundations. We could be certain, 
on reflection, that those non-incorrigible beliefs were objectively probable. 
Once again, the example in the previous section shows that nothing beyond 
incorrigible beliefs enjoys that kind of reflective assurance. We can never 
entirely get rid of the possibility that our beliefs are radically mistaken. We 
can, of course, reflect and give good reasons to think that our beliefs are 
mostly true. This more moderate form of reflective assurance is available on 
Phenomenal Conservatism as well. But neither theory can extend the special 
reflective assurance belonging to incorrigible beliefs to the non-incorrigible.
The emerging trend is that Classical Evidentialism is running a campaign 
on promises it can’t keep. It asks us to restrict the foundations of our noetic 
structures to the incorrigible, promising that this will guarantee the probable 
truth of beliefs based on those foundations and allow us to dispel skeptical 
worries once and for all. These are things it cannot do. Nothing beyond the 
incorrigible can enjoy such security.
Once we realize this, there isn’t any reason we can see to limit properly 
basic beliefs to the incorrigible. Indeed, it begins to seem quite arbitrary to 
say that incorrigible beliefs are properly basic because they seem true, but 
other beliefs are not properly basic even though they too seem true. These 
other beliefs might be less evident, but that just means we shouldn’t hold 
them as confidently as we do incorrigible beliefs, not that we shouldn’t hold 
them at all. The natural position is that our justification for basic beliefs 
should be proportional to the degree of subjective assurance we have in their 
content. This, of course, is just the view of Phenomenal Conservatism, which 
says that the degree of justification you have for a basic belief is proportional 
to how strongly its content seems true (other things being equal).
§3 Final Worries
We have already mentioned (in our defense of Phenomenal Conservatism) 
that we worry Classical Evidentialism leads to skepticism. This is because 
there doesn’t seem to be strong enough arguments based solely on the 
incorrigible to justify our robust confidence in all matters of common 
sense. And even if there are, people don’t actually base their beliefs on such 
arguments. They do not acquaint themselves with their ordinary judgments, 
acquaint themselves with how things appear to them, and then acquaint 
Debating Christian Religious Epistemology38
38
themselves with the connection between their judgments and how things 
appear, which is what Classical Evidentialism requires of them in order to 
be justified.
We should say, however, that such skeptical concerns are of less import 
in our thinking than the above sorts of considerations. Going back at least 
to Descartes, Classical Evidentialists limited properly basic beliefs to the 
incorrigible because this was supposed to provide special guarantees of truth 
to the rest of one’s noetic structure. Once we realize this isn’t the case, there 
just isn’t any good reason we can see for limiting the domain of properly 
basic beliefs in this way.
Notes
 1. Strictly speaking, Phenomenal Conservatism is just the single epistemic
principle:  If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S
thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. But
there are a cluster of additional epistemological theses that fit naturally
with Phenomenal Conservatism. For convenience, we will often speak of
“the Phenomenal Conservative approach” as though it incorporates these
additional positions.
 2. At least one of us openly endorses this. The other prefers to formulate
Phenomenal Conservatism in terms of a more subjective form of epistemic
probability.
 3. Not unless they are willing to embrace skepticism and limit justified beliefs
to the incorrigible.
